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Introduction
According to the most recent Gallup poll, a miniscule 13% of American citizens approve
of the way Congress is handling its job, and as recently as November the approval rating hit an
all-time low of 9%.1These historically low approval ratings align directly with another
historically low metric. The Pew Research Center recently confirmed that the 113th Congress’s
first session will mark the least productive year in terms of substantive legislation passed in over
two decades, with a mere 55 laws passed (Desilver). Americans’ adamant disapproval of
Congress is evidently a function of the deficiency of passed legislation they rightfully expect
from the House and Senate. At the same time, it would be absurd to think that politicians’ desire
to serve in Congress is to not advance public policy. So how can it be that if the American
public is so displeased with policy inaction, and Congressmen, whether via intrinsic motivation
or because of promises made to constituents, are motivated to pass laws, that legislation is
simply not being passed?
Inaction and the associated public frustration with the legislative branch is a result of the
rampant growth in partisanship brought on by ideological polarization. Political polarization
refers to the increasing divergence between Democratic and Republican legislators’ general
viewpoints. Representatives’ strict adherence to consistent ideologies and party platforms results
in distinct, adversarial parties that cannot operate effectively in a governmental system requiring
broad support and compromise to advance legislation.
Despite obvious public disapproval of Congress’s conduct, some academics believe that
polarized politics are not to blame for congressional ineptitude and may even be somewhat
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beneficial.2Abramowitz (2010, 160-170) contends that divided party government is more to
blame for legislative ineffectiveness than polarization. Brooks and Geer (2007)suggest that
incivility brought upon by polarization may positively affect political engagement. However,
recent scholarship has unequivocally determined that polarization does lead to legislative
ineffectiveness and gridlock. Sinclair (2006, 358) found that 42% of bills failed in the 103rd107th Congresses, opposed to just 27% in the 91st, 95th, and 97th Congresses. Mann and Ornstein
(2012, 90-91) highlight examples of pure ineffectiveness caused by bitter polarization. For
example, a bill that passed the Senate by a vote of 98-0 took nearly four weeks to become
enacted due to unnecessary filibusters mounted from the opposing party. Polarization devastates
the legislative capacity of Congress, resulting in legislatures that consistently fail to advance
public policy, justifying the public’s scathing disapproval of congressional performance.
Contexts of Party Conflict
As troubling as today’s polarized environment may be, asserting that divisiveness in
politics is a new phenomenon would be naïve. Politicians are nothing if not passionate, and
throughout the nation’s history, statesmen from opposing parties have zealously attempted to
advance their policy goals at the expense of rival parties. Brownstein (2007)traces the dynamic
history of contention between the two parties and ultimately identifies four distinct phases of
party interaction. The first phase, stretching from 1896 through 1938, was an era of hyperpartisanship that closely resembles the current polarized environment. An era of sustained
bipartisanship beginning with the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and concluding
around the time of Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 reelection and the civil rights movement defined the
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Discussed at length later is a report published in 1950 by the American Political Science Association that urges
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second phase. The third phase, from the mid-1960s until the mid-1990s, was a time of transition
in which the forces propagating cooperation began to diminish, followed by the final phase
beginning roughly in the late 1990s: the current state of extreme partisan polarization.
Ironically, in the heart of the period Brownstein called “a golden age of statesmanship
and cooperation in Congress,” the American Political Science Association’s Committee on
Political Parties published an extensive report expressing its dismay regarding the state of
political parties. The reportcalled for extensive reformation of the two parties. The committee
stressed the need for more internal cohesion among the parties, the emergence of a more
effective opposition party, intense loyalty from the members of both parties, more involvement
from the parties’ National Committees, and, most importantly, an illumination of the differences
between Democratic and Republican platforms, all with the aim of providing the American
electorate with a more democratic, responsible, and effective government. The authors alleged
that the necessary party distinctions would not cause the parties to differ unusually and that
increasing focus on party programs would not elicit an ideological wall between the
parties(Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System). The desire for transformed parties most
likely resulted from the notion that although Republicans tended to be conservatives and
Democrats tended to be liberals, the presence of conservative Southern Democrats and moderate
and liberal Northern Republicans made these associations unclear, blurring important policy
alternatives that constituents ought to have and know about in a democratic society. The
publication is mostly theoretical in nature and largely refrains from specifying political actors
that drove the committee’s dissatisfaction, but the authors do deem public distinction between

national Democrats and Dixiecrats3 as “antagonistic,” lending credence to the legitimacy of these
two groups’ presence as motivation (18). Mann and Ornstein (2012, xii)also suggest that the
political scientists’ frustration with Southern Democrats’ blocking of progressive social policies
in Congress inspired the report. While the Southern Democrats brought conservatism to the
Democratic Party, moderate and liberal Northern Republicans were a force on the other side of
the aisle, albeit not as strong as their counterpart. While the prominence of these two factions
may have frustrated the APSA’s Committee on Political Parties, the presence of what some
referred to as a four-party systemoften enabled compromise and created an environment in which
no party or ideology dominated the legislature. This dynamic in American politics began to
change during the civil rights movement. Republican legislators, most notably the Republicans’
1964 presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, began to stake out more conservative stances in
regards to civil rights and equitable treatment of African-Americans, something that still
appealed to many southern states’ voters being represented in Congress by Democrats.What
followed was a“Southern realignment,” where southern states increasingly elected Republican
congressional representativesdue to the party’s stance on civil rights legislation. This led to the
replacement of conservative Democrats with conservative Republicans in the South as well as
overwhelming African-American support of the Democratic Party.Virtually all political scientists
agree that this change was a catalyst for polarization, and nearly all studies of polarization are
predicated on the notion that significant trends emerged in the early to mid-1970s when the
transition’s effects could be seen in legislators’ voting habits.4
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The Dixiecrat Party was a conservative faction of the Democratic Party rooted in the southern United States. The
party strongly opposed civil rights.
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King (2003) and Hetherington (2001) are two such examples.

Identifying Polarizing Forces: The Public, the Political Elite, and Their Interaction
Early scholarship on polarization usually employed interest group ratings, such as those
issued by the American Civil Liberties Union or the United States Chamber of Commerce, to
measure a legislator’s ideology based on voting behavior. Unsatisfied with these metrics, Poole
and Rosenthal (1997)revolutionized the study of polarization by developing a measurement
called D-NOMINATE, which subsequently became the currently used measurement, DWNOMINATE: Dynamic Weighted Nominal Three-Step Estimation. The complex statistical
procedure allowed the authors to analyze every roll-call vote in the first 100 congresses and
assign legislators scores on a -1 to +1 scale, with -1 being the most liberal end of the spectrum
and +1 the most conservative.5Nearly all newer research on polarization now uses DWNOMINATE scores to measure legislators’ ideological positions due to the complexity,
effectiveness, and accuracy of the metric.6The widespread use of DW-NOMINATE indicates an
important aspect of modern polarization: that it is characterized by the increasingly extreme
ideologies seen from elected officials.
Two competing theoretical bases have emerged to provide frameworks for causal
analysis of polarization among today’s congressmen.Some scholars claim that the drastic
changes America has undergone as a society in the past four decades have resulted in a more
polarized electorate and that this public polarization is absorbed appropriately in legislators’
voting behavior.Many researchers, however, are hesitant to accept that the electorate has become
polarized in their policy preferences, subscribing instead to the long-held view that there are not
substantial ideological differences between Americans’ political views.These individuals claim
5
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that polarization among legislators is not driven by divergent viewpoints of the masses but rather
is caused by polarization of the political elite, comprised of the politicians themselves, various
party leaders, opinion leaders, and political activists who vigorously participate in the political
arena. Most proponents of elite polarization posit that any evidence of polarization among the
electorate is actually “partisan sorting,” which will be discussed at length in a later section.
Societal Change and the Polarized Public
Some scholars look at the various profound cultural changes the United States has
experienced in recent decades and believe this evolvement may result in a more polarized
citizenry represented by more polarized politicians.Abramowitz (2010) has written extensively in
support of popular polarization and makes his case by providing arguments linking trends in
educational attainment levels, marriage rates, and age, racial, and gender compositions to
polarization, among other factors. Using data from the American National Election Studies, he
shows that those who considered themselves politically sophisticated also were those with higher
education levels and that these respondents also identified as having more ideologically
consistent views. Using the same robust dataset, he demonstrates how married couples have
come to represent an important ideologically conservative base for the Republican Party while
younger voters constitute an ideologically consistent liberal base for the Democratic Party.He
also documents women’s increasing support for the Democratic Party as a potential factor in
polarization. Thus, legislators are pulled toward the ideological poles to cater to these crucial,
distinct members of their constituencies.As have numerous others,he also points out thatgrowth

in the minority population has contributed to polarization due to minority citizens’ propensity to
identify with the Democratic Party.7
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006, 71-138)persuasively credit the notion that societal
change in the United States over the last several decades hasincreased polarization, specifically
in regard to economic inequality and increased immigration levels. They begin their study by
showing the strong correlation between the widening gap of top/bottom quintile income earners
and the gap between Democratic and Republican legislators’ ideological stances. Controlling for
other demographic factors correlated to income, the authors then estimate a model and find that
liberal-conservative ideologies of congressmen are significantly affected by the widening income
gap. Further, they conclude that stratification of partisanship by income has grown rapidly over
the past forty years, causing a notable rich-poor divide amongst Democrats and Republicans.The
authors also find that since the early 1970’s, American immigration levels have risen steadily
and that these noncitizens are much more likely to have lower incomes than the median
constituent in a given location. These noncitizens’ ineligibility to vote results in a deficient
amount of political pressure for redistributive policies and disproportionate pressure from
wealthier voters against such policies,resulting in even more polarization due to income
disparities.
Bishop (2008) argues that the increasing division in politics is largely a result of
geographic polarization. He coins the term “assortative migration” to refer to the phenomenon
of Democrats’ moving to Democratic counties while Republicans did the same due to cultural
homogeneity of party members. He references many of the aforementioned societal changes and
argues that geographical sorting exacerbates these changes’ influence on legislator
7
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behavior.Simply put, if an area is full of people with the same opinions and lifestyles, a
representative will adopt a strict ideological stance and have little incentive to alter positions. He
places particular emphasis on religious individuals and their residential choices, pointing out,
forexample, that Republican landslide8counties have seen enormous growth in the number of
survey respondents saying that they regularly attend church services. Many other scholars also
point to changing religious views as a major driver of polarization. Using national exit polls,
Abramowitz and Saunders (2005, 12-16) find that religion was correlated more strongly with
partisanship than income, education, gender, and other demographic characteristics.Dionne
(2005, 175-205) provides analysis on religion’s effect on polarization, noting that those who
identify as more religious are more prone to be conservative Republicans while secular
individuals tend to vote Democratic. However, he contends that pundits in the media portray a
larger effect than what is true and that regional and racial differences inflate the purported effect
religion has on polarization.
Electoral and Institutional Explanations for Legislator Polarization
As stated previously, polarization is characterized by legislators’ ideologically divergent
voting behavior. Consequently, researchers disagreeing thatpublic opinion drives this divergence
are not attempting to further clarify that legislators have become polarized. Rather, they seek to
prove that legislators’ polarization is a result of the politicians’, and other members of the
political elite, own ideological divergence.Many scholars have turned toaspects of the electoral
system as well as changes in congressional procedure in attempting to explain the increased
polarization.
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There has been substantial public discussion about the presumed impact on polarization
of interest groups’ and political action committees’ involvement in campaign financing. The
sheer growth in the cost of running a campaign warrants such discourse. Abramowitz,
Alexander, and Gunning (2006, 83)note that the median spending of winners in House elections
grew from just over $40,000 in 1974 to over $600,000 in 2002. Surveying the recent literature
on campaign finance’s relationship to polarization, Barber and McCarty (2013, 31-32)note that
associations between the two are subtle and more ambiguous than is widely believed. While
claiming that PAC contributions’ effects on legislator ideology are minimal if significant at all,
they do contend that an increase in reliance on ideologically extreme individual donors for
money may force candidates towards the ideological poles to appeal to these voters, although
they caution that more research is needed to certify this relationship.
Another suggestion for increased polarization that many casual observers of American
politics assume to be significant is the abuse of the redistricting process via partisan
gerrymandering. State legislatures, which are often dominated by one political party, control the
drawing of congressional districts. The incentive to cunningly craft these districts as to
maximize the party’s representatives in the federal government is obviously legitimate.
However, heated debate has arisen among academics as to the validity of the argument.
Grainger (2010, 545-567) found a unique way to test whether state legislatures’ control of the
process led to polarization. He compares legislatively drawn districts with panel-drawn districts
in California and finds that, on average, legislatively drawn districts garner less competitive
elections than panel-drawn districts.9 He shows that as these districts become less competitive,
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California put the redistricting process in the hands of a panel of non-partisan judges (546). These less competitive
contests were the result of legislatively-drawn districts containing high, disproportionate concentrations of certain
types of voters.

legislators tend to take more extreme voting positions, thus affirming the association between the
ability to gerrymander and polarization. Carson, Crespin, Finocchiario, and Rohde (2007) find
that districts experiencing changes due to redistricting have become more polarized than districts
that have remained relatively unchanged but acknowledge that the effect is modest. These and
other studies similar in nature are, however, outnumbered by scholarship proposing that
gerrymandering actually does not lead to polarization. McCarty et al. (2006) assert that
polarization results from variances in how Democrats and Republicans represent the same
district rather than which districts each party represents. Abramowitz et al. (2006, 78-79)show
that redistricting has little or nothing to do with declining competitiveness in House elections,
which is the supposed negative ramification of redistricting and partisan gerrymander. Mann
(2006, 267-269)points to increases in Senate polarization mirroring polarization in the House as
evidence of gerrymandering’s insignificanceand claims other factors contributing to
uncompetitive elections, such as the advantages enjoyed by incumbents, are more explanatory
elements. Elsewhere, Mann (2004)assesses what measures could be taken to positively reform
the redistricting process as to combat rising polarization, only to conclude that the effect of
legislative redistricting is quite modest and perhaps more legitimate factors in polarization are
geographical sorting and the parties’ regional realignment, both discussed herein.
Political scientists have also been drawn to the nature and structure of congressional
elections, particularly primary elections, in their studies of polarization. There are
essentiallyfivetypes of primary elections for congressional elections in the United States: open,
closed, semi-closed, blanket/top-two non-partisan, and mixed in which each party has a different
primary type.Scholars postulated that closed primaries, those in which only registered partisans
can vote, would push more polarized candidates to the general elections, due to the fact that

initially (for the primary) they needn’t develop policy platforms catered to those who were not
registered to their respective political party. Conversely, open primaries, in which any eligible
voter can vote in any party’s election, should tend to bring less polarized candidates to the
general election. As theoretically sound as these hypotheses may be, the research community
has found minimal evidence that primary election types have a notable effect on polarization.
The most convincing argument, by Gerber and Morton (1998), demonstrated that representatives
from states with closed primaries took much more extreme policy positions, in terms of voting
behavior, than the median voter in their district. More recent work has overwhelmingly
disproven these results. Ansolabehere, Hanson, Hirano, and Snyder, Jr. (2010) provide perhaps
the most extensive analysis on polarization and primary elections. The authors selected states
that adopted primary elections and analyzed legislator voting behavior before and after primary
elections were made mandatory. They find no discernable change in roll-call voting habits, as
measured by DW-NOMINATE, signifying that primary elections of any type do not affect a
representative’s ideology. The authors also conclude that primary election turnout is only an
insignificant factor in explaining polarization. However, they do find that general election
competition is negatively correlated with legislator polarization, indicating that the increased
competition incentivizes a legislator to converge his or her views away from ideological poles.
Some congressional scholars have attempted to identify causes of polarization by
analyzing changes in the internal structure, procedures, and norms of both chambers of Congress.
Barber and McCarty (2013, 33-34)note that changes regarding Committee of the Whole
procedure allowed easier addition of amendments that the opposing party could introduce to
thwart otherwise promising legislation. They also refer to relevant literature arguing that the
majority party leadership’s power over the congressional agenda has increased, resulting in more

party-line voting. They do, however, acknowledge that both of these changes are specific to the
House of Representatives and that increasing polarization levels in the Senate may cast doubt on
the significance of these procedural alterations. Mann and Ornstein (2012, 84-100)point to the
marked increase in the willingness of congressmen to employ holds and filibusters as a driver of
as well as an indicator of polarization.10 They point out that holds and filibusters historically
have beenused only on heated issues, and extremely seldom at that, but now these maneuvers
have become commonplace. The prevalence of these tactics causes unnecessary delays and
party-party disdain, especially in connection with executive appointments.
Roberts (2012, 22-23) explains how the breakdown of a particular congressional norm
has contributed to the hyper-contentious political arena: legislators are no longer moving their
families to Washington. He notes that wives’ increasing likelihood of having careers and
subsidized travel contribute to this trend. He contends that congressmen today so often condemn
the institution of Congress and the special interest groups occupying the Capitol while
campaigning that they fear looking like a hypocrite if they move there themselves. The personal
relationships forged among legislators of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (that are not seen
frequently today) were invaluable to bipartisan efforts. He rhetorically poses, “If, on the
weekend, you stand next to a congressional colleague on a soccer field or sit next to him or her in
church, are you less likely to vilify that college on the floor of Congress during the next week?”
Relating Elite and Mass Polarization: The Role of Party Sorting and Political Activists
Although some scholars focus on either elite or public polarization, most research
concerns itself with the interaction of the two phenomena, particularly with how elite
10
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polarization is absorbed by the public. Discussions of this dynamic relationship typically turn to
analyses of “partisan sorting” and the importance of political activists. These two aspects of the
literature are very rare in that it is widely agreedthey are both crucial to understanding the
puzzling array of potential causes of polarization.
Party Sorting
Fiorina (2005)vehemently argues that polarization is a phenomenon found solely among
the political elite while most Americans remain moderate in their political preferences. These
claims are backed by analyses of voters’ policy preferences as derived from the 2000 National
Election Studies. Multiple times he shows that citizen positions on a number of political issues
are normally distributed across a liberal-conservative spectrum, as opposed to a morebimodal
distribution that would be expected if the electorate was truly becoming polarized.Therefore,
measures of increasing partisanship or ideological consistency among the electorate must be the
cause of something other than polarized policy positions. He claims that the culprit is partisan
sorting, which is essentially the electorate’s response to elite polarization.How might this
partisan sorting be the cause of polarization?The polarized political elite in both parties have
developed more ideologically consistent platforms on a liberal-conservative scale, translating to
a cluster of distinct positions that citizens now associate with a certain political party and then
“sort” themselves accordingly.Arguably the most notable evidence that party sorting has
occurred is provided by Fiorina and Levendusky (2006). In their work, the authors state that
party sorting is “the process by which a tighter fit is brought about between political ideology
and party affiliation” (53).They show that respondents in the National Election Studies who saw
“important differences in what Democrats and Republicans stand for” increased by over 30% to
an astounding 76% from 1972-2004 (56-57).Today, the terms liberal and conservative can now

be equated with Democrat and Republican.11To contrast, before the aforementioned Southern
realignment, there were liberal Republicans as there were conservative Democrats, so the parties
were not directly associated with an ideology as they are today, and one could have perhaps
founda voter who staunchly advocated for 2nd Amendment rights while favoring
heavygovernment spending, due to the fact that he or she was unaware that those positions
belonged to different parties’ platforms.McCarty and Barber (2013, 25) note that few scholars
dispute that serious partisan sorting has occurred and that sorting creates a problematic interplay
between elites and voters. As voters sort in response to polarization among elites, the parties
then have less reason to craft policy to entice independents, moderates, or members of the
opposing party, perpetuating the problem at hand. To prove that party sorting is truly a response
to elite polarization, scholars simply needed to show that polarization among politicians
preceded increases in partisan identification. Hetherington (2001, 621-623)used the distance
(divergence) between average DW-NOMINATE scores of House Republicans and Democrats
from the 81st to the 104th Congress as a measure of polarization and compared this score to
answers related to partisanship from the National Election Studies. He found that the increased
distance preceded increases in measures of mass partisanship, indicating that the clearer
ideological stances seen in government resulted in partisan polarization via response to elite cues
(sorting) in the electorate. Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz (2006, 95-96)echo these findings,
noting that ideological polarization among the electorate became evident in the 1980s,
succeeding congressional polarization documented in the 1970s. Convincing evidence of party
sorting comes even from those that argue mass polarization causes elite polarization, when
Saunders and Abramowitz (2006) find “a substantial increase in the ability of citizens to apply
11
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ideological labels to the political parties” (178).Agreement about party sorting is why when
discussing studies of polarization trends and potential causal relationships, partisanship and
ideology have often been interchanged as the dependent variable representing polarization.
Political Activists’ Polarization and Increasing Influence
Thus far, analyses regarding the political elite have been constrained to discussions of
legislators/politicians. However, other individuals comprising the political elite consist of
interest group leaders, campaign workers, and most importantly, those known as political
activists. All members of the political elite are effectively political activists, but scholars have
focused on non-elected individuals who actively participate in campaigns as potentially
polarizing activists. Those considered activists are, and always have been, more polarized than
the general public. Voters that actively participate in the political processare likely to have
extreme opinions and views fueled by strong emotions, often times regarding just one or two
aspects of policy (known as “issue activists”).12Considering that activists have always been more
polarized political actors, the research questions surrounding them have been twofold. First,
have activists become more polarized recently? Second, has activists’ influence on politicians
voting behavior grown?
Research has answered both questions resoundingly in the affirmative.Fiorina and
Abramowitz have debated for years over whether or not the entire public is polarized, but they
agree that activists crucially contribute to polarization. Saunders and Abramowitz (2006, 37)show that active partisans were significantly more polarized than the overall electorate and
only quarrel with Fiorina’s claim that this group of voters represents a small segment of the
12

Most scholars derive classifications of political activism from national exit polls, and normally define activists as
those who participate in at least two campaign-related activities beyond voting. See Abramowitz and Saunders
(2005, 6) for example.

electorate.13Sinclair (2006, 25-27)shows that those identifying with a party and classifying as
activists were truly polar opposites on their policy views. For example, in a 2004 poll, one can
see the difference between Democratic and Republican activists differ by 72% on a question
gauging the size of government, while non-activist but still party-affiliated voters differed by a
mere 13%. Although most scholars disagree with claims that polarization is present amongst the
public at large, studies such as these may serve as proof that important societal trends and
cultural changes do have an effect on polarization, just that its effects are seen in the activist
population.14
Activists have not only become more ideologically polarized, but their relative influence
on the political process has increased. Although a previously cited study found no relationship
between primary election turnout and polarization, several scholars have turned to primary
election participation as a key component driving legislator polarization. King (2003)first
summarizes a previous study of his that quantifies the idea that activists are more ideologically
extreme. He then goes on to show how declining voter turnout in congressional primaries causes
primaries to be dominated by activists, who will in turn elect polarized legislators. Fiorina and
Levendusky (2006, 70) share the concern that activist-packed primaries could be a driver of
polarization, pointing out that more than 80% of the voters in 2004 primaries who identified
themselves as activists were also partisans. These activists represent a small chunk of the
electorate at large, but the lack of visibility in congressional elections, especially primaries,
causes these activists to be disproportionately represented in the voting population. Fiorina and
Abrams (2008) most effectively summarize a possible reconciliation of mass and elite
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polarization: “[T]he consensus in the research community is that macro-level changes in
American politics and society led to greater homogenization of party elites and activists, a
process that reinforced itself as more distinct parties sent clearer cues to the electorate, which
gradually sorted itself out more neatly than it had been sorted at mid-century” (581).
Model Development: Data Overview
Research exploring the extremism of modern politicians has yielded little agreement and
reveals that the issue is complex and multifaceted. Such a complicated area of study requires
several decisions to be made about the nature of any research endeavor. Scholars must make an
initial decision as to which chamber of Congress they will analyze. The Senate has experienced
notable polarization, but the majority of researchers focus on the House of Representatives
because it has become significantly more polarized as a whole than the Senate and because it
allows for more granular examination.15Some researchers look at Congress’s behavior as a whole
and do not concern themselves with individual members. I have chosen to collect and analyze
data from United States congressional districts in order to effectively profile areas that elect
polarized representatives. Pinpointing the characteristics of congressional districts allows for
more data to be analyzed compared to studies of aggregate behavior of the House, and can reveal
factors that result in extreme legislative behavior.
The most commonly used measure of legislator polarization is the DW-NOMINATE
procedure developed by McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal.16Polarization scores for every single
congressman are publicly available from the authors on voteview.com, and serve as the

15
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Poole and Rosenthal (1997) was the initial publication of the procedure.

dependent variable in all of my analyses.17Also, to truly profile a district, one must accumulate
its demographic information. I acquired demographic data from every congressional district in
the United States using the Census’s American Community Survey for the past four congresses
(109th-112th), excluding the current session because polarization scores are not final. The
somewhat limited scope of demographic data offered from the Census simply means that my
models’ conclusions apply to very recent polarization trends. Many studies have made use of the
American National Election Studies’ surveys on political opinion to gauge district opinions.
However, I came across a handful of research that suggested drawbacks to using data from the
survey.18Using demographic data as opposed to survey data, my analyses become inherently
inferential because these variables do not specifically gauge opinion. In my analyses, I have
selected appropriate, clear metrics to align with theoretical postulations and will draw on the
current literature when making inferences as to how demographic variables translate to opinion.
Primary and general election turnout data was procured from the Federal Election Commission’s
website, fec.gov. District’s presidential election results were used, as is common in studies of
polarization,to gauge a district’s partisan leaning, and were obtained from
SwingStateProject.com.19This array of district level data allows for the development of statistical
models that can test many of the competing theories present in the current literature on the causes
of intense polarization.
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Model Development: Variable Selection and Preparation
The Census provided a wide variety of demographic variables for a given congressional
district. I experimented with numerous variables that could have been remotely related to a
potential cause, and ultimately decided on a select group that could accurately test a number of
the theories presented in the current literature. The high degree of multicollinearity present with
demographic variables, that are often related, strongly affected which variables I could include.
Before I began constructing models, I needed to transform the observations for legislator
polarization to absolute values. I am interested in the general extremism of the representative
rather than whether he or she is extremely liberal (-1) or extremely conservative (+1), and a scale
ranging to -1 would be essentially be treated as “negative” extremism, which would pose
problems. However, many polarization researchers argue that the Republican Party has become
more conservative than the Democratic Party has become liberal, and I test this assertion in a
separate regression model.My models will be simple linear Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
regressions as I was not convincingly led to believe a different functional form was needed to fit
this data.
Variable Description
Without using survey data that asks questions regarding policy opinions, acquiring
variables that test elite and activist polarization was somewhat difficult. Considering the
painfully low attention that congressional elections get on a national level, both primary and
general election turnout serve as accurate measures of a district’s activism.20 Also, although
some proponents of mass polarization suggest educational attainment trends are a reflection of
societal shifts affecting polarization, measures of educational attainment actually can serve as an
20

In the review of the literature, aspects of the electoral system were suspected to have polarizing influences, and
these metrics also analyze the extent that electoral structure contributes to a representative’s extremism.

effective proxy for activism. It is widely accepted in political science that educational attainment
is the best predictor of a person’s propensity to be a political activist.21I used the percentage of
the population who had attended at least some college as a measure of district education.22For
these three variables that represent elite polarization, I expect different relationships.
Considering that primaries are dominated by activists, I propose that more voters in a primary
will lead to a more polarized legislator due to his needed adherence to activist views. However, I
expect that more voters in the general election will result in a less polarized legislator because
more ordinary citizens are engaged, and therefore must be represented by the legislator. Some
might argue that this same relationship should apply for primaries, as increased turnout would
drown out activist influence, but primaries have substantially less visibility than general
congressional elections (which are still quite obscure themselves) and are generally not as
activist-dominant. The remaining variables are used to gauge the extent that societal change
contributes to polarization. There is considerable debate as to whether or not societal change
polarizes activists or the entire population, and relating these variables’ significance to
hypotheses in the literature seeks to add to the debate. These demographic variables are all
measured as percentages of the district population, with the exception of the monetary amount of
public assistance and the foreign born population. Three metrics were used in the model to
account for economic inequality within a district: the unemployment rate, the amount of public
assistance a family receives, and the poverty rate for families. As economic inequality is said to
polarize legislators, I expect these variables to have a positive relationship on polarization, where
increases in these percentages will result in increases in representative polarization. The foreign
born population and minority population were also included in the models, to represent

21
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See Hillygus (2005) for one example. This relationship is universally accepted in political science.
Introducing more than one metric for education introduced multicollinearity.

immigration and race as potential polarizing factors. Marriage rates were also hypothesized to
have a polarizing effect, and a district’s percentage of married couple families was included to
test this supposed positive relationship. To account for the notion of geographical polarization, I
included a metric that documented how long a family had lived in the same house within that
district. I expect that those who have lived in the same house for over a year will tend to elect
polarized legislators. Lastly, I included the female population of a district as another potentially
polarizing factor, as it has been purported to affect legislator polarization. Subsequent models
include all of these same explanatory elements, with additional variables related to partisanship
and party identification.

Variable
Representative Polarization
Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Families
Same House
Female

Summary Statistics
Relationship Prediction Observations
1796
+
1765
1737
+
1740
+
1740
+
1740
+
1740
+
1740
+
1743
+
1740
+
1740
+
1743

Mean
0.50
60465.35
231685.60
26.41
8.61
3517.69
10.90
89566.54
25.51
48.80
84.33
50.80

Std. Dev Min
Max
0.20
0.01
1.29
43515.34 0.00 233034.00
68074.40 50550.00 480900.00
5.88
9.70
40.80
3.29
2.80
27.50
1215.20 1210.00 9099.00
5.17
1.80
38.90
77368.03 3527.00 419149.00
17.72
1.94
88.14
7.82
19.10
66.20
3.54
68.78
94.60
1.03
45.50
54.90

Econometric Analysis
There are a few areas of potential bias in my models. As stated previously, variable
selection was partly contingent upon containment of multicollinearity amongst variables.
Demographic data often faces the issue of multicollinearity, as income variables are related

toeducation variables, education variables are related to unemployment levels, and so on.23As a
general rule of thumb, I ensured that variables in my initial model did not have variance inflation
factors (VIF) in excess of five to best alleviate the issue of multicollinearity.24When testing for
heteroskedasticity using the traditional White Test, I did find that significant heteroskedasticity
presented itself. To account for this bias, I employ robust standard errors in all models. Robust
standard errors also alleviate problems of potential serial correlation.25Perhaps the most likely
source of bias comes in the form of omitted variable bias. There are dozens of speculated causes
of polarization, and finding district-level data on several potentially significant sources was not
possible. One popular cause yet to be addressed is the polarizing influence of the news media.
Mutz (2006) demonstrates that the large numbers of sources of political news along with the
prevalence of entertainment-based political news are elements dividing public opinion. She also
notes that the uncivil, and unrepresentative, discourse so often displayed in the media causes
many viewers to view opposing opinions with more disdain, adding to the polarizing influence
the media can have.26As necessary as this element may be, district-level data for media
preferences or the media’s influence are not available. Also, the effects of congressional
procedure are normally assessed when looking at Congress as a whole, and therefore cannot be
endogenous in district-level models, so any explanatory importance institutional changes have on
polarization trends will be omitted. District-level religious data is not included in the American
Community Survey and is typically found in exit polls or other surveys accompanying elections.
The American Community Survey did contain median age data for the last three Congresses, but
23

See McCarty et al. (2006, 72-113) for discussions of correlation among common demographic variables.
See Appendix Section II. The fixed effects model and the model including party identification are notably
affected by multicollinearity, as shown by high VIF’s of certain variables.
25
Considering my data is panel data with a small amount of Congresses, it is highly unlikely autocorrelation is
problematic in my models. Robust standard errors would alleviate the problem if for some reason it was
substantially present.
26
See Prior (2007) for additional research on the nature of media and polarization.
24

the associated survey for the 109th Congress included different metrics for age, and therefore
median age was omitted as to not serve as a bottleneck in maximizing data inclusion. I was only
able to procure campaign finance data on a select sample of states, and a condensed model with
this variable is included in the appendix.27I did not find a way to formally test for the effects of
gerrymandering, but models introducing district partisanship may shed light on redistricting’s
role in polarization.28
Initial Model

Model 1

Representative Polarization
Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Family
Same House
Female
_cons

27

Number of Observations
F( 11, 1697)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

Robust HC3
Coefficient
Std. Err.
1.97E-07
-1.90E-07
0.002684
0.0021966
0.0000123
-0.0023976
2.38E-08
-0.0002695
0.0065406
-0.0090449
0.01826
-0.0714115

1.24E-07
1.04E-07
0.0009956
0.0024215
5.03E-06
0.0017541
8.12E-08
0.0003643
0.0009278
0.0016905
0.0057215
0.2903284

t

P>t

1.58
-1.82
2.7
0.91
2.45
-1.37
0.29
-0.74
7.05
-5.35
3.26
-0.25

0.114
0.069
0.007
0.364
0.014
0.172
0.77
0.459
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.806

1709
15.89
0
0.0803
0.19446

[90% Confidence Interval]
-7.93E-09
-3.62E-07
0.0010459
-0.0017886
4.07E-06
-0.0052844
-1.10E-07
-0.000869
0.0050137
-0.011827
0.0092098
-0.54922

4.01E-07
-1.81E-08
0.004323
0.006182
2.06E-05
0.000489
1.57E-07
0.00033
0.008067
-0.00626
0.028042
0.406397

See Section IV of Appendix. The Campaign Contributions metric is insignificant, perhaps providing more
support for the ambiguity of campaign finance’s effects on polarization.
28
If a district’s partisan make-up is a significantly polarizing factor, one may infer that the state legislature drawing
the districts was aware of the partisan dynamic of the state and drew maps accordingly, but this assumption would
need to be put to much more formal tests.

I chose to perform hypothesis tests using one-sided, 90% confidence intervals because I
am predicting coefficients to be negative or positive, not simply different from zero. The
regression analysis above shows for which variables the null hypothesis can be rejected,
affirming which variables truly have a significant relationship with representative polarization.29
Six different variables, representing indicators of both mass and elite polarization, are
statistically significant drivers of polarization in the model. The percentage of married coupled
families proved to be a strong predictor of legislator polarization. Marriage rates represent just
one societal change that is alleged to polarize legislators. Marriage rates are historically low and
have been declining, and scholars have suggested that married families tend to be polarizing
agents, particularly in the conservative direction. The proportion of people who had lived in
their same house for over a year proved to be significant, but the relationship was oddly in the
wrong direction, suggesting that those who have lived in a district longer tend to elect less
polarizing officials. My intuition behind including this variable in the model was that those
districts who had a high concentration of people living in their same house would mean that
these citizens were more ingrained in their communities and lived similar lifestyles, things that
Bishop (2008) suggested seriously affected polarization. The aforementioned omitted variables
may play a role in causing significance, or perhaps inclusion of this metric was unwarranted.
The model also showed that districts with more females tend to be more polarized. This is a
demographic factor that related directly to Democratic Party polarization, and subsequent models
accounting for partisanship will reveal more about this relationship, but nonetheless this
relationship supportsthe notion that societal shifts may polarize legislators. The education level
of a district, as measured by those citizens who attended at least some college, proved to be a
29

P>t represents a variable’s p-value. Variables with p-values under 0.10 are deemed significant, and are bolded in
the regression outputs.

driver of polarization. Although this variable could be argued by mass polarization as well as
elite polarization proponents, as noted above, education is a safe proxy for district activism. The
positive relationship produced from this data quantifies the belief that activists are crucial in
explaining polarization. Most theory in regards to inequality and polarization attempts to relate
incomes to voting behavior, but median income and per capita income both introduced major
multicollinearity into models and thus I was left to include the three metrics seen here. Although
two of the three variables related to economic inequality are deemed insignificant by this model,
on average, districts where citizens received more public assistance tended to elect more
polarized legislators. The last predictor of importance was the amount of voter turnout in general
elections. Ansolabehere et al. (2010) found that general election competitiveness had a negative
effect on legislator polarization, and the results from this model echo the authors’ telling
conclusion. The insignificance of primary turnout could perhaps be explained by the two
competing ideas touched on earlier when discussing the variable’s inclusion in the model.
Perhaps in some districts, greater turnout does mean that activists’ influence are diffused while in
other districts larger relative turnouts translates to a wealth of activists that a legislator is
compelled to represent.

Fixed Effects Model

Model 2

Number of obs
1709
F(454, 1251) =
.
Prob > F
=
.
R-squared
0.7298
Root MSE
0.12276

Representative Polarization

Coefficient

Robust HC3
Std. Err.

Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Family
Same House
Female

2.67E-07
-6.54E-07
-0.0055809
0.0124726
5.34E-06
-0.0087918
8.47E-07
-0.0000949
-0.001598
0.0045612
0.0152849

1.80E-07
1.16E-07
0.00146
0.0029
5.77E-06
0.00446
4.62E-07
0.0016
0.00486
0.00342
0.01001

t

P>t

1.48
-5.61
-3.83
4.3
0.92
-1.97
1.83
-0.06
-0.33
1.33
1.53

0.138
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.355
0.049
0.067
0.953
0.742
0.183
0.127

[90% Confidence Interval]
-2.91E-08
-8.46E-07
-0.0079801
0.0077026
-4.17E-06
-0.0161358
8.67E-08
-0.0027307
-0.0096025
-0.0010747
-0.0011973

5.63E-07
-4.62E-07
-0.00318
0.017243
1.48E-05
-0.00145
1.61E-06
0.002541
0.006407
0.010197
0.031767

In many districts, a legislator’s polarization score did not change across congresses. This
model is a fixed effects model and factors out instances in which there was no change in
polarization, and therefore the new coefficients are identified off of the variation among districts.
One could argue that eliminating such observances results in an unrepresentative sample, but
analyzing variable districts may offer us a better look at which district-level changes translate to
different, extreme voting behavior. The substantially improved R2 suggests that this procedure
was perhaps more effective in pinpointing polarizing traits. However, when testing for
multicollinearity, there were several variables that had variance inflation factors well above the
recommended threshold of 5, so this bias may indicate that the initial model is more

effective.30Nonetheless, variable significances in this condensed model differ only slightly from
the initial regression. Percentage of married couple families as well as the percentage that lived
in the same house became insignificant. Family poverty rate as well as the education metric
became significant in this model, but in the opposite direction I was expecting. This is somewhat
perplexing, and I can only attribute this to omitted variable bias andthe multicollinearity issues
discussed previously. Interestingly enough, one variable gauging economic inequality, the
unemployment rate, did become significant. Unemployment is not a direct measure of inequality
by any means, but it is a great measure of a district’s general economic performance, and is
strongly associated with more economically unequal areas. Foreign born population also became
significant in this model, providing some strength to the argument of McCarty et al. (2006) and
others who speculate that rising immigration has been a driver of polarization. Two variables
relating to activism, general turnout and percentage who attended some college, became even
more significant in this condensed model.
Model Introducing District Partisanship
The review of the literature included a lengthy discussion of the impact party sorting has
on polarization. Specifically, scholars posit that the phenomenon of party sorting contributes to a
false view that cultural and societal differences polarize Americans, who then elect polarized
politicians. A simple regression model including a metric of district partisanship along with the
variables in the initial model may seek to clarify party sorting, and the extent to which it explains
polarization.31 The strong correlation of polarization and partisanship that defines partisan

30
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See Section II of Appendix. The variable Some College is obviously severely biased.
District partisanship is measured by presidential vote shares. (65%, 53%, etc.)

sorting has been discussed, but displaying the importance district partisanship has on
representatives’ polarization can quantify sorting’s pervasiveness across variables.

Model 3

Number of obs
F( 12, 1696)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

Representative Polarization

Coefficient

Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Family
Same House
Female
Partisanship
_cons -.4353345

8.04E-08
-1.02E-07
0.0036933
0.0026195
0.0000143
-0.0031547
-3.49E-08
-0.0015756
0.0086972
-0.0079919
0.0126251
0.0076917

Robust HC3
Std. Err.

t

P>t

1.21E-07
1.01E-07
0.00093
0.00227
5.11E-06
0.00161
7.95E-08
0.00036
0.00089
0.00158
0.00539
0.00062
0.27027

0.66
-1.01
3.97
1.16
2.81
-1.96
-0.44
-4.34
9.77
-5.04
2.34
12.35
-1.61

0.508
0.311
0.000
0.248
0.005
0.05
0.661
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.019
0.000
0.107

1709
28.44
0
0.1503
0.18698

[90% Confidence Interval]
-1.19E-07
-2.69E-07
0.0021632
-0.0011083
5.94E-06
-0.0058047
-1.66E-07
-0.0021729
0.0072321
-0.0105991
0.003752
0.0066669
-0.8801241

2.80E-07
6.40E-08
0.0052233
0.0063473
0.0000227
-0.0005047
9.59E-08
-0.0009784
0.0101623
-0.0053846
0.0214982
0.0087165
0.009455

Partisanship dominates the regression, proving the prevalence of party sorting. If party
sorting was irrelevant, partisanship would have similar predictive power as other variables in the
model. Many of the variables remained significant, which implies that they are ideologically
polarizing by themselves and that partisanship is not significant in explaining their polarizing
influence. On the other hand, introducing a measure of district partisanship has several effects
on other variables, indicating some direction of correlation with partisanship. For example,
general turnout is now insignificant in this model, and is negatively correlated with
partisanship.This observation is in accordance with previous models: general turnout proved to

have a significant negative relationship on polarization, and if polarization and partisanship are
closely aligned we should expect a negative relationship. The lack of significance simply
indicates that partisanship and polarization, as similar as they may be, cannot be directly equated.
The significance of the percentages of married couple families, minorities, and females relate
directly to assertions reviewed in the literature.32 Married couple families were said to represent
a polarizing Republican group of political actors while minorities and females were hypothesized
to contribute to polarization among the Democratic Party, so it is not surprising that these
particular variables were highly correlated with district partisanship, which leads to their
significance in the model.33
Models Introducing Party Affiliation
The aim of this study is to identify factors that contribute to legislator extremism in
general. However, a number of scholars assert that the Republican Party has become more
polarized and extreme than the Democratic Party.34To test the widely purported notion that
Republican legislators have become more polarized than Democratic legislators, I included a
dummy variable, where Republican identification is the included indicator while Democratic
identification constitutes the omitted condition.

32

The relationship of minority population on representative polarization is the opposite of what is expected. In the
next model, we are very close to seeing the significant positive relationship that was expected. I attribute this
model’s anomaly to the omitted variable of Party Identification, which is included in the next regression.
33
A correlation matrix in the appendix (Section III) shows variables’ relationship to partisanship, which highlights
reasons for the different significances seen in this model.
34
Hacker and Pierson (2006) is perhaps the most extensive analysis on what the authors deem “asymmetric
polarization” as a result of Republicans’ move to the right., Mann and Ornstein (2012) are two of many other
scholars who assert that Republicans have played a larger role in modern polarization.

Model 4

Number of Observations
F( 12, 1650)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

Representative Polarization

Coefficient

Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Family
Same House
Female
Party Indicator (1 = Republican)
_cons .0472892

2.89E-07
-6.34E-08
0.0018567
-0.0004087
0.0000195
-0.0021157
2.65E-07
0.0005105
-0.0037287
-0.0019286
0.0101937

Robust HC3
Std. Err.

t

P>t

8.89E-08
7.83E-08
0.00078
0.00185
4.14E-06
0.00117
7.89E-08
0.00031
0.00081
0.00125
0.00437
0.009
0.21898

3.25
-0.81
2.39
-0.22
4.7
-1.81
3.37
1.63
-4.63
-1.54
2.33
34.05
0.22

0.001
0.418
0.017
0.825
0.00
0.07
0.001
0.103
0.00
0.124
0.02
0.00
0.829

1663
125.29
0
0.4766
0.14738

[90% Confidence Interval]
1.43E-07
-1.92E-07
0.0005797
-0.0034455
0.0000126
-0.0040393
1.36E-07
-4.50E-06
-0.0050548
-0.0039887
0.0029985
0.2917942
-0.3131091

4.35E-07
6.54E-08
0.00313
0.00263
2.6E-05
-0.0002
3.95E-07
0.00103
-0.0024
0.00013
0.01739
0.32143
0.40769

The previous model showed the relative strength of partisanship in relation to
polarization, and this model overwhelmingly confirms that the Republican Party drives the
partisan polarization more so than the Democratic Party.35The significance of the Republican
indicator variable is somewhat staggering, and reveals that going from 0 to 1 (Democrat to
Republican) is associated with a roughly 0.30 increase in representative polarization in this
sample.However, this model does not formally test whether, for example, increases in the
population of females polarizes specifically Democratic legislators, which is the hypothesized
relationship. To confirm that a certain variable’s significance was dependent upon party
affiliation, I created interaction variables and ran a separate model, which confirmed the party35

P-values are derived from T-statistics, and the larger the t-statistic is the more statistically significant the variable
is. PartyID has a t-stat of 34.05 compared to partisanship’s (from the previous model) t-stat of 12.35.

specific relationships mentioned in the review of the literature and that may be inferred from the
most recent model.36
Model Introducing Party Affiliation with Interaction Variables
Model 5

Number of obs
F( 14, 1648)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

Representative Polarization

Coefficient

Robust HC3
Std. Err.

t

P>t

Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Families
Party ID (1 = Republican)
Party ID*PrimaryTurnout
Party ID*Female
0 (Dem) .0096807
1 (Rep) -.0055472
Party ID*Married Couple Families

8.44E-08
-4.45E-08
0.0024007
-0.008707
0.0000179
-0.0017594
2.62E-07
0.0001626
-0.0064093
0.6298072
3.40E-07

1.12E-07
7.38E-08
0.00076
0.00179
4.15E-06
0.00115
7.38E-08
0.00031
0.00076
0.49758
1.71E-07

0.76
-0.6
3.14
-0.49
4.32
-1.53
3.55
0.52
-8.44
1.27
1.99

0.449
0.547
0.002
0.626
0.000
0.127
0.000
0.604
0.000
0.206
0.047

-9.92E-08
-1.66E-07
0.0011419
-0.0038138
0.0000111
-0.0036542
1.41E-07
-0.0003532
-0.0076591
-0.1890926
5.85E-08

2.68E-07
7.70E-08
0.00366
0.00207
2.5E-05
0.00014
3.83E-07
0.00068
-0.0052
1.44871
6.22E-07

0.0096807
-0.0055472
0.008348

0.00407
0.00864
0.00151

2.38
-0.64
5.53

0.018
0.521
0.000

0.0029789
-0.0197619
0.0058641

0.01638
0.00867
0.01083

0.0430269

0.22832

0.19

0.851

-0.3327404

0.41879

_cons

[90% Conf. Interval]

Two potentially polarizing factors that are attributed to a specific political party are
female population and percentage of married couple families, and the significance of these
variables’ associated interaction variables validates the aforementioned assumptions.37The
inclusion of party identification initially had one particularly striking effect on a variable:

36
37

1663
111.6
0
0.4931
0.14512

In Section II of the Appendix, one can see that multicollinearity is again problematic.
See “Societal Change and Public Polarization” section.

primary turnout became extremely significant. The above model’s interaction variable for
primary turnout is statistically significant, confirming that if a legislator is a Republican opposed
to a Democrat, higher primary turnout significantly contributes to that legislator’s polarization.
This implies that Republican primaries are dominated by activists and that an increase in turnout
translates to more extreme representation measured by the winning representative’s voting
behavior.
Conclusion
Necessary compromise in the legislative process has become nearly unattainable today
due to legislators’ divergent, extreme, and unwavering ideological stances associated with their
political parties. The ineffectiveness and gridlock brought upon by this political polarization has
resulted in a federal legislature that roughly 90% of the population views as unsatisfactory.
Scholars noted a trend of ideologically divergent voting behavior in Congress
approximately four decades ago and have since attempted to identify causes of polarization.
Exploration of the trend has revealed the complexity of the issue, leading to few areas of
consensus within the research community. Some academics argue that the American culture has
changed so significantly that the American public at large has become divided and polarized.
Other researchers contend that a small group of political elites and activists are polarized and
responsible for the unusual level of contention in Congress. These individuals allege that any
suggested polarization of the electorate is actually party sorting, where ideologically moderate
individuals simply understand which parties associate with which viewpoints and are not truly as
ideologically consistent as the parties in government.

Econometric techniques are effective tools to quantitatively test the many theories
surrounding political polarization and its causes. Accumulating data on multiple variables
provides a profile of a district that elects legislators whose extreme, ideologically-bound voting
behavior inhibits legislative productivity. In the econometric analyses presented here, one can
see evidence that societal change polarizes legislators, that activists and political activism can
polarize representatives, as well as evidence supporting the legitimacy of party sorting. Across
the various models, a metric associated with economic inequality consistently had a significant
and positive relationship with representative polarization. This supports the view that the
widening gap between top and bottom earners leads to a lack of political pressure for
redistributive policies. Considering economic inequality and polarization are becoming
increasingly popular in public discourse, I expect many publications in the near future to shed
more light on the two trends’ relations. Several other variables tracking cultural change were
found to have significant relationships with polarization, specifically in regards to a district’s
proportion of females, minorities, and married couple families. Female and married couple
populations are significant factors without accounting for district partisanship, supporting the
claim that the new cultural complexion of the American public drives legislator polarization.
The minority population was only significant when including a district’s partisan make-up,
indicating that partisanship is more important in explaining polarization than minority
population.38The magnitude of district partisanship’s significance reveals that polarization and
partisanship are highly related, a correlation that defines the striking trend of party sorting that
has gained considerable acceptance in academia and questions the validity of societal factors’

38

Female and married couple family population became more significant after the addition of partisanship, implying
that these variables definitely still have a relationship with district partisanship.

explanatory power. Further, these analyses show that the Republican Party contributes
significantly more to the trend of polarization than the Democratic Party.
Perhaps the most important result of the multiple econometric models is that all of the
metrics associated with political activism were significant. Education, a safe proxy for political
activism, proved to polarize representatives in each model.39Primary turnout proved to be a
significant factor of polarization for Republican legislators, an indication that activists dominate
Republican primary congressional elections and that increased turnout translates to more extreme
voting behavior for these congressmen. Most importantly, increased turnout in general elections
led to less polarized representatives. The primary focus of this research was to find factors that
increased polarization, and general election turnout constituted as the only variable shown to
have a negative effect on polarization. This relationship reveals the first and perhaps best step to
begin combating rising polarization: increase the visibility of congressional elections.
Just over 40% of the population tends to vote in general congressional elections.40Not
every vote is a winning vote, so an even smaller percentage of the population is actually
represented in Congress. 90% of the nation may disapprove of the legislative branch’s
performance, but in reality the representatives in Congress represent just over 20% of
Americans. When turnout increases in these contests we see that legislators are less
ideologically extreme because they must vote on behalf of more people and viewpoints. These
elections are not highly-publicized and visible to average individuals who do not closely follow
politics. To combat polarization, society must find a way to communicate these elections’
importance to citizens who are not politically active and increase participation and turnout in
39

The fixed effects model is an exception, where multicollinearity in this model is especially problematic for the
education metric.
40
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these elections. If we can significantly increase voter turnout in these elections, congressmen
will have to represent a broader constituency and will vote in a less polarized manner, leading to
a greater possibility of bipartisanship and overlap in party platforms and initiatives.
Analyzing political polarization has proven to be a difficult endeavor, reflected by a body
of literature replete with debates and arguments surrounding potential causes. Current research
and analyses herein show that cultural changes are important when discussing polarization, but
cannot be the primary reason behind the ideological divergence among congressmen from
opposing parties. Party sorting and the actions of political elites and activists are more crucial in
understanding polarization. Finding a simple solution to such a complex problem is highly
unlikely. Exhaustive reforms of primary elections or the redistricting process may sound
appealing to many, but to many others whose research proves these causes to be trivial, these
reforms would be ineffectual. The visibility and mainstream recognition of congressional
elections may constitute as the best means of hindering the growth of polarization.

Appendix
Section I: Key Terms

 Polarization: the divergence between Democratic and Republican legislators’ ideological
stances

 Ideology: collective system of ideas, values, and viewpoints that strongly guides
individual opinions and behavior

 Liberal/Conservative Ideology: generally, liberal views are those that support
government intervention and aid in social and economic life while conservative views
tend to oppose government intervention in social and economic life. Poole and Rosenthal
(2007, 3)elaborate on the ideological spectrum: “Someone who favors higher minimum
wages is also likely to favor lower defense spending, affirmative action programs, higher
capital gains taxes, and so on. We can think of the continuum of ideological positions as
ranging from Left to Right or very liberal to moderate to very conservative. Consider
these six senators: Edward Kennedy (D-MA), Robert Byrd (D-WV), Sam Nunn (D-GA),
Alphonse D’Amato (R-NY), Strom Thurmond (R-SC), and Jesse Helms (R-NC). There
would be widespread agreement among American politics buffs that the order given
above is the appropriate liberal/conservative ordering.”

 Party Sorting: the process by which a tighter fit is brought about between political
ideology and party affiliation; represented by the increasing association of conservative
ideologies with the Republican Party and liberal ideologies with the Democratic Party;

 Political Elites: politicians, party leaders, opinion leaders, campaign donors, and other
people active in the electoral and political process. Together, the group has the influence
to shape party platforms that are directed to the masses

Section II: Variance Inflation Factors of Models
Variance Inflation Factors: Initial Model
Variable

VIF

Family Poverty Rate
Unemployment
Married Couple Families
Minority
Foreign Born
General Turnout
Cash Public Assistance
Female
Some College
Same House
Primary Turnout

3.65
2.89
2.65
2.58
2.29
2.07
1.8
1.73
1.59
1.57
1.19

Mean VIF

2.18

Variable Inflation Factors: Fixed Effects Model
Variable

VIF

Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Families
Same House
Female

3.89
4.56
5.36
8.24
4.5
36.99
159.92
83.3
64.23
11.48
9.64

Variable Inflation Factors: Model with Partisanship
Variable

VIF

Family Poverty Rate
Unemployment
Minority
Married Couple Families
Foreign Born
General Turnout
Cash Public Assistance
Partisanship
Female
Some College
Same House
Primary Turnout

3.65
2.89
2.77
2.75
2.3
2.08
1.8
1.75
1.75
1.6
1.57
1.2

Mean VIF

2.18

Variance Inflation Factors: Model with Party ID
Variable

VIF

Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Asssistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Families
Same House
Female
Party ID (1 = Republican)

1.19
2.05
1.58
2.83
1.83
3.58
2.31
2.54
2.97
1.63
1.75
1.45

Mean VIF

2.14

Variance Inflation Factors: Model with Selected Interaction Variables
Variable

VIF

Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Minority
Married Couple Families
PrimaryTurnout*Party ID
Female*Party ID
0
1
Married Couple Families*Party ID

2.22
1.94
1.52
2.74
1.81
3.51
2.31
2.62
3.08
4.2

Section III: Partisanship and Select Variable Correlation

Selected Variables Correlation Matrix

Partisanship
General Turnout
Minority
Married Couple Families
Female

Partisanship
1
-0.3294
0.5861
-0.5586
0.2668

880.32
935.41
88.4

Section IV: Model Including Campaign Expenditures (from Select Sample of States)
Campaign Contributions Model

Representative Polarization
Primary Turnout
General Turnout
Some College
Unemployment
Cash Public Assistance
Family Poverty Rate
Foreign Born
Married Couple Families
Campaign Contributions
_cons

Number of obs
332
F( 9, 322)
5.95
Prob > F
0
R-squared
0.1128
Root MSE
0.21973

Robust HC3
Std. Err. t

Coefficient
2.15E-07
7.03E-08
0.0031213
0.0053641
0.0000158
-0.007968
2.47E-07
0.0061225
-2.90E-08
0.1180472

3.37E-07
2.52E-07
0.00273
0.00754
1.7E-05
0.0044
3.12E-07
0.00168
2.66E-08
0.15523

P>t
0.64
0.28
1.14
0.71
0.93
-1.81
0.79
3.64
-1.09
0.76

[90% Confidence Interval]
0.525
0.78
0.254
0.477
0.353
0.071
0.429
0
0.276
0.448

-4.49E-07
-4.25E-07
-0.0022553
-0.0094667
-0.0000176
-0.0166278
-3.66E-07
0.002813
-8.12E-08
-0.1873479

8.78E-07
5.66E-07
0.0085
0.02019
4.9E-05
0.00069
8.60E-07
0.00943
2.33E-08
0.42344

The selected states were Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Missouri, Tennessee, and Wisconsin due to their similar populations and number
of congressional districts.
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